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ABSTRACT
Against the international backdrop of rising religious tensions, this
article explores contemporary civil society views on religious
freedom in Bangladesh. It uses critical frame analysis of the corpus
of civil society organizations’ (CSOs) submissions to the United
Nations’ third cycle Universal Periodic Review (UPR), 2013–18. It
provides a timely assessment of Bangladesh’s fulfilment of
international obligations on religious freedom, and shows how the
politicization of religion and the resultant conflict between
‘secularism’ and ‘extremism’ have been fuelling inter-communal
tensions and religious intolerance. In particular, CSOs’ UPR
submissions present powerful accounts of the principal human
rights pathology affecting the country today, religious-based
violence. This is accompanied by a narrative of police malpractice,
judicial failings, discrimination, oppression and incitement. A
further key finding is ‘situated knowledge’ or first-hand accounts
of legal restrictions and government repression of civil society
organizations. Consonant with the classical work of liberal
theorists, we argue that unprecedented importance now attaches
to safeguarding civil society criticality in order to defend religious
freedom and uphold human rights in the Republic.
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Introduction
Bangladesh is a country with marked faith-based tensions. These have been recently
thrown into stark relief following the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 2011
that confirmed Islam as the State religion of the Republic. This has supported the rise
of a range of Islamic extremist groups, led to religious radicalization and ‘attacks and
threats against religious minorities’ (HRW, 2018, p. 2). Whilst communal tensions are
nothing new, of late, they have escalated to unprecedented levels. The reasons for this
are not just weak governance or the absence of a strong state, but also the clash of
secular and religious ideologies. As Khan (2017, p. 191) argues, Bangladesh ‘is currently
facing an incremental growth of radicalization…Over time, political violence, ideological
clashes between secular and right-wing ideologies, and weak governance have created
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conditions for the growth of radical Islam’. This rise of radical Islam has threatened con-
stitutional values such as democracy and secularism.1 Furthermore, it has also violated the
country’s obligations under a raft of UN human rights treaties that uphold the principle of
religious freedom.
Taking this into account, this article provides a timely assessment of the issues and
challenges in fulfilling Bangladesh’s international rights obligations on religious
freedom. It uses discourse analysis of the corpus of civil society organizations’ (CSOs) sub-
missions to the third cycle (2013–18) Universal Periodic Review (UPR), the United
Nations’ (UN) official five yearly monitoring mechanism. Specifically, it explores the
‘issue-salience’ – or, level of attention afforded to – different human rights ‘pathologies’2
(in other words, rights violations and implementation failings) related to the upholding of
religious freedom identified by CSOs in their UPR submissions. Furthermore, in order to
provide an in-depth understanding of inherent meanings, lived experiences and senti-
ments around contemporary religious freedom issues, it uses textual analysis to
examine CSOs’ use of language – or, ‘framing’ in the discourse.
Such a methodology emerges from – and, at the same time helps to inform us of – the
challenges posed by seeking to apply the universalist norms underpinning UN rights
agreements in specific governance contexts with their own cultures, histories and govern-
ing traditions. In short, this ‘governance view’ of rights implementation reflects the reality
that local human rights practices are contingent and place-based. In the case of Bangladesh
such specificities include governmentality – not least, periods of authoritarian rule, party
politics and political patronage. As the following analysis reveals, such factors underpin a
series of contemporary pathologies such as restrictions on civil society, corruption in
public administration (in turn, contributing to authorities’ failure to uphold religious
freedom including police malpractice) and government failure to respond to earlier
UPR recommendations. In addition, inequalities and discrimination in the pluri-religious
state explain the prevalence of violence, threats and incitement.
The current ‘governance view’ of rights implementation (meaning that we not only
examine the exercise of executive power and public administration – but also civil
society perspectives) is consonant with the classical work of liberal theorists (Hobbes,
1651; Rousseau, 1968), as well as later thinkers on the role of civil society (e.g., De Tocque-
ville, 1835/1956). This is apposite because key importance attaches to civil society critical-
ity in order to uphold religious freedom and address prevailing human rights pathologies.
Accordingly, the remainder of the article is structured thus: the next section provides a
theoretical discussion on the relationship between religious freedom, secularism and civil
society. This is followed by an outline of the research context; attention then turns to the
study methodology. The study findings follow – first, in relation to the nature and salience
of different pathologies, and second, CSOs’ use of critical framings. The implications of the
analysis are outlined in the conclusion.
Religious Freedom, Secularism and the Civil Society
Religious freedom is a complex and contested concept (Cf. Sullivan et al., 2015); one that is
considered central to upholding values of secularism. The latter is a broader concept that
originated with the idea of the separation of the church from the state or the immanent
from the transcendental (see Taylor, 2011). Over the years, scholars have defined it in
2 P. CHANEY AND S. SAHOO
different ways. For example, advocates of secularization theory define it in terms of priva-
tization of and/or decline of religion (see Berger, 2009). Calhoun (2011, p. 22), however,
argues that defining secularism as religious privatization is misguided, because ‘religion
has never been essentially private’. Casanova (2011) too argues that the secular and the
religious are mutually constitutive and there are multiple ways of experiencing the
secular.3 As a result of these interpretations, different countries have adopted contrasting
models of secularism. Compared to the European4 and American context where secular-
ism refers to the ‘wall of separation’5; in the Indian context it referred to dharma nirapek-
shata (religious neutrality) and sarva dharma samabhava (religious equality). The latter
terms broadly mean ‘twin tolerations’ (see Stepan, 2011), or what Bhargava (2011) has
called ‘principled distance’ which refers to peaceful coexistence of different religions
that are equidistance to the state. The Bangladeshi context is similar to India for secularism
refers not to the separation of religion and politics, but the peaceful coexistence of diverse
religious communities and the exercise of religious freedom.
Secularism thus creates the essential conditions for religious freedom in a particular
political context. Whereas in religious thinking there is an emphasis on the idea of ‘com-
munity’, in secularism primacy is afforded to individuals and citizenship rights. According
to this view it is the fundamental duty of the state to ensure and protect these individual
rights, especially the right to religious freedom. Although religious freedom can mean
many things, in this article we define it as tolerance of different theological systems of
belief (and, crucially, non-belief), and freedom of individual action to follow one’s own
beliefs – whether faith-based, atheist or agnostic. As Sajó and Uitz (2012, p. 136)
explain, ‘the formulation of freedom of religion and conscience as an individual right
stems partly from placing religious choices in individual conscience… In a legal sense
it is the scope of protection a legal system is willing to provide to individuals and
groups claiming that their religious liberty has been restricted’.
In contrast, religious extremism aligns itself with the notion of religious particularism
(Glock & Stark, 1966). While religious particularism may not always result in extremism
or violence, what is observed is that religious particularism is often associated with intol-
erance of ‘other’ viewpoints. It denotes ‘a belief in the exclusive authenticity of one’s own
religious tradition. Religious particularists are likely to believe that salvation is confined to
rather narrowly defined groups of believers’ (Swatos, 2003, p. 79).6 Furthermore, extre-
mism is often driven by a sense of past injustice and a desire for revenge.
In the context of rising religious extremism, civil society can play a positive and con-
structive role in fostering tolerance between communities and religious traditions (Freed-
man, 2009). However, first we need to consider the questions ‘what is civil society’ and
‘how can it advance religious freedom’? As with secularism and religious freedom, con-
ceptions of civil society also vary widely (Chaney, 2019, p. 532; Jensen, 2006, p. 39;
Sahoo, 2013, p. 24).7 While liberal theorists like De Tocqueville define civil society as a
strong, vibrant associational life that acts as the watchdog of democracy, neo-Marxist
scholars like Gramsci see it as a site of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic struggle (see
Kumar, 1993). Other scholars such as Habermas define it as the ‘public sphere’ where
private individuals transcend their ascribed identities and come together as a public and
form an interactive body of citizens engaged in a rational critical discourse (see
Calhoun, 1992). In this article, we follow the liberal, De Tocquevellian view of civil
society as associational life wherein CSOs generally work to uphold democracy. According
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to this view, civil society is neither governed by the logic of acquiring state power (like pol-
itical parties) nor by the logic of maximizing profit (as with private enterprises following
market forces). In contrast, civil society’s objective is to act as a ‘sphere of solidarity’ (Alex-
ander, 1997) and protect public interest and democratic values. When the state tries to
violate or undermine such values, civil society mobilizes to remind the state of its obli-
gations. However, in authoritarian or unaccountable state contexts, civil society is often
oppressed and the state ignores its commitments to democratic values and citizenship
rights.8 At present, this is primarily the case in Bangladesh where the state undermines
pluralism and the diversity of civil society – and ignores its international commitments
to religious freedom and rights of minorities. As the UN Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights warned: ‘the Government should protect the
vibrant civil society and pluralistic society in Bangladesh by addressing the existing
anxiety expressed by members of religious minorities and indigenous peoples who feel vul-
nerable in the face of rising religious extremism and acts of violence perpetrated against
them… civil society should continue to claim its space, with the support of international
stakeholders, to express dissenting views and voice concerns as appropriate’ (OHCHR,
2016, p. 20, para 104).
Research Context
This section discusses the historical background and contextualizes the study’s findings. It
has two parts. The first (‘Background’), deals with religion and demography, followed by
an overview of the interplay of politics and religion in the latter part of the
twentieth and early twenty-first Century. The next part (‘Current Challenges’) discusses
the political turmoil, the rise of extremism and challenges facing civil society.
Background
The last official state-wide census9 revealed that, of Bangladesh’s 152.5 million people,
Sunni Muslims constitute 90% of the population and Hindus make up 9.5%. The remain-
der is predominantly Christian (mostly Roman Catholic) and Theravada-Hinayana Bud-
dhist. Other minorities include, Shia Muslim, Bahais, animists and Ahmadiyya Muslims.
Estimates of the latter vary widely (Hasan, 2017, p. 314). In the wake of the post-2015
humanitarian crisis (for a discussion see Mahbubul Haque, 2017), there are approximately
30,000 registered and up to 600,000 unregistered Muslim Rohingya refugees in the south-
east around Cox’s Bazaar.
In terms of history, the Bengali-speaking Muslims of East Pakistan revolted against the
Urdu-speaking Muslims of West Pakistan and created the new nation of Bangladesh. Soon
after independence in 1971, this ethno-linguistic nationalism (‘we are Bengalis, we want a
nation of Bengali-speaking people’) shifted towards religious nationalism (Karim, 2005,
p. 5), manifesting itself in increasing Islamization. Although there had always been a
tussle between the secular and the religious forces, the Bangladeshi state in the early
years of independence maintained a strong secular orientation. However, things
changed quickly and the state secularism came under pressure partly because of
‘foreign policy compulsions’ – economic aid from oil-rich Islamic countries forced the
founding leader Mujibur Rahman to embrace the views of Islamic religious forces
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(Datta, 2002, p. 146). As a consequence, ‘despite the official ban on religious political
parties, Mujibur’s secular socialist policies led… to the introduction of “multi-theocracy
in the name of secularism”’ (Datta, 2002, p. 146).
Subsequently, as Siddiqi (2006, p. 2) notes, there was ‘a gradual but sustained main-
streaming of Islam in public political life, in the representational practices of the state
as well as in national policy and constitutional principles, began in the mid-1970s… By
the mid-1990s, Islamic symbols and idioms had become part of everyday political vocabu-
lary’. This transitional period began in 1975 with the assassination of Sheik Mujib, the
country’s first political leader. For the next decade-and-a-half the political landscape
was dominated by leaders drawn from the army: General Ziaur Rahman (1975–81) and
General Hossain Ershad (1982–90). In order to legitimise their hold on political power
both offered political concessions to potential allies. Moreover, they quashed political
dissent, and at the same time introduced constitutional reforms. These actions gave
greater legitimacy to the application of Islamist principles in public life. This culminated
in 1977, with the government of General Zia that brought in a new constitution; one that
removed the commitment to secularism10 and emphasized the Islamic legacy of the
nation. During this period the ban on religious-based political parties was also
removed. In a further step-change, in 1988, General Ershad amended the constitution
and made Islam the official state religion.
In 1990, a mass movement led by the main opposition parties in association with the
principal Islamist political force – the Jamaat-e-Islami – forced President Ershad out of
office. With the restoration of democracy in 1991, it formed a ruling coalition with the
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).11 Throughout subsequent years Islam has continued
to be an important aspect of mass politics with the two largest political parties (Awami
League and BNP) keen to highlight their Islamic credentials and uphold Islam as an inte-
gral part of political life and national identity. Although this intermixing of religion and
politics resulted in several instances of violence, Bangladesh, up until early 1990s, was rela-
tively free from communal violence. However, this changed significantly when:
The country witnessed the first major outbreak of communal violence in November 1990 fol-
lowing tensions in India in the wake of the Ayodhya controversy. [Later…] attacks on
Hindus increased dramatically after the 1992 Babri Masjid destruction incident.12 The
growth of religious tension in India had a spill over effect and Bangladesh for the first
time witnessed large scale violence perpetrated on the Hindus. (Datta, 2002, p. 316)
Current Developments
At the turn of the twenty-first century, Bangladesh witnessed increasing religious violence
and radicalization of youth, especially in the form of armed militants. Scholars have noted
that madrasas may have played a major role in this regard. As Huque and Akhter (1987,
p. 204) note, ‘the madrasa is one of the principal educational institutions contributing to
the process of socialization into the Islamic way of life’. The background to this lies in the
period 1991–1996, during which, as Rahid (2012, p. 25) observes, ‘there was remarkable
expansion of Madrassa education (religious education) with state support. The growing
number of unskilled Bangladeshi workers in the Middle Eastern countries made Bangla-
desh’s economy increasingly dependent on foreign remittances. At the same time, Saudi
funding to various Islamic NGOs began to proliferate in Bangladesh starting their
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operation’. Bhardwaj (2011, p. 3) concurs with this view and notes, to understand ‘the
history of the Islamisation of Bengal, [it is] essential to understand the roots of Islam in
Bengal… the resurgence of Islam after the 9/11 attacks in the US, and the growth
Middle East-funded Madrasa schools are important factors’. For its part the UN has
observed that,
While perhaps half of the madrasas follow the national curriculum, a large number of Qaumi
madrasas, with their own curriculum continue to operate outside of the Ministry of Edu-
cation. Members of religious minorities have frequently expressed their fears that the madra-
sas, in particular Qaumi madrasas, promote extremist views, such as stigmatizing all non-
Muslims as “infidels”. The spread of madrasas, in particular those not operating in line
with the national curriculum, seems to be a main source of anxiety among religious min-
orities. (OHCHR, 2016, para 69)
In addition to the impact of the madrasas, there has also been continued political party
support to extremist groups. For example, Khaleda Zia13 included the Jamaat [-e-Islami
Bangladesh] in her cabinet, which some scholars referred to as ‘playing with fire’
(Lintner, 2004, p. 433). Subsequently, as Riaz (2008, p. 33) explains, ‘Islamists in
general and Jamaat-e-Islami in particular, are exercising influence beyond their support
base in society, and have been forcing the majority onto the defensive’. However, in
early 2010, Sheikh Hasina’s support to secularists brought her into conflict with Islamic
extremists.
Notwithstanding this tumultuous political backdrop, in 2011, the Fifteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution14 (the version that is valid today) confirmed Islam as the State
religion of the Republic. Yet crucially, in a more liberal vein, it also gave legal recognition
to the fact that other religions may be practised in peace and harmony (Article 2A). More-
over, the revised Constitution asserts the aim of eliminating communalism in all its forms.
However, in a most contradictory fashion it proscribes the granting by the State of political
status in favour of any religion and the abuse of religion for political purposes. It also
deems discrimination against, or persecution of, persons practising a particular religion
unconstitutional (Article 12). Whilst it might constitute a more pluri-religious framework,
the confirmation of Islam as the official state religion means, contrary to some claims
(Salehin, 2013); it does not amount to restoration of secularism. With hindsight,
perhaps this is unsurprising. As Anis (2015, p. 17) reflects:
secularism has had a beleaguered existence in Bangladesh. For many it has never meant a full
separation of religion and state, but rather a peaceable side-by-side existence of different reli-
gious communities. In a region wracked with horrific communal violence, this is no small
concern. As a result, secularism has never really meant the freedom to think or speak on reli-
gious matters.
More recently, the UN Human Rights Council echoed this point:
some of the measures taken by the Government in the interest of upholding secularism seem
to lead to the paradoxical result of shrinking the very space that secularism— like democracy
— is supposed to provide… In other words, while the Government may be fighting the
instrumentalization of religion, it could at the same time be seen as using religion to
achieve political goals. This may erode the credibility of the Government’s profession of
inclusive secularism. (OHCHR, 2016, p. 8, para 35)
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The reality is that the Fifteenth Amendment does not represent an abrupt shift from a
hitherto secular state. Rather, it reflects the latest chapter in Bangladesh’s history
whereby, ‘Islam and politics are inextricably interrelated and intertwined. The amalgama-
tion of Islam with politics, which is in other words called Islamism or political Islam, has
been a characteristic feature of Muslim society since the dawn of Islam’s culture and civi-
lization’ (Islam & Islam, 2018, p. 17). As Hasan (2012, p. 69) explains, ‘the complexity of
the secular-religious problem that Bangladesh has faced since its establishment… is a
national problem, with a national context that has become global’.
However, aspects of this historical narrative sit uncomfortably with the Republic’s
international treaty obligations. As the OHCHR (2016, p. 4, para 11) notes, ‘Bangladesh
is party to almost all core human rights treaties’. These include the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, acceded to in 2000) and the International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD, acceded to in
1979). Article 18 of the former states, ‘Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a
religion or belief of his [sic] choice, and freedom, either individually or in community
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, obser-
vance, practice and teaching’. Whilst Article 5 of the latter asserts, ‘the right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion’.15
Despite Bangladesh’s (albeit ambiguous) constitutional guarantees and international
treaty obligations on religious freedom, a fundamental shortcoming is that protection
under domestic law is limited. For reformers it was hoped that the Discrimination Bill
2015 would change matters, but it has yet to be enacted, leading to criticism from the
UNHRC. It asserted that, ‘the State party should ensure that the anti-discrimination
bill, 2015, protects against direct and indirect discrimination in the public and private
sphere based on a comprehensive list of grounds for discrimination, including colour,
descent, caste, national or ethnic origin, religion… Furthermore, the State party should:
Protect the safety and security of persons belonging to minority religious groups and
ensure their ability to fully enjoy their freedom of religion and to worship without fear
of attack’ (UNHRC, 2017, p. 3, para 12a).
Not just failing to protect minority citizens from discrimination and violence, the state
has also failed to protect the autonomy and diversity of civil society. In fact, the state has
been fearful of civil society’s questioning of its inability to maintain law and order and
protect rights and freedom of citizens, especially ethnic and religious minorities. As a con-
sequence, it has developed deep distrust towards civil society and prevented its involve-
ment in ‘political’ and ‘sensitive’ affairs. Given this, civil society has become
depoliticized and instead of promoting state accountability and raising issues that are
vital to democratic governance, civil society’s task has now generally been limited to apo-
litical delivery of welfare services.
Subsequently, in the wake of the political turmoil of 2015,16 the context for CSOs has
yet worsened, and the human rights agenda has been forced into the background (See
Feldman, 2015; Haque & Ahsan, 2014; Mohajan, 2014; Saidul Islam, 2011). Recent
accounts attest to ‘civil society groups fac[ing] pressure from both state and non-state
actors, including death threats and attacks from extremist groups, and escalating harass-
ment and surveillance by security forces’ (HRW, 2018, p. 2). As Husain (2016, p. 291)
notes, ‘it is obvious that present-day Bangladesh shows very clear tendencies of intolerance
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on the basis of social, political and religious identity. Such intolerance, however, is a
phenomenon, which contradicts the traditions of the country spanning over a thousand
years where tolerance and coexistence with different groups were cornerstones of its civi-
lisational ethos’.
Methodology
In methodological terms, the present analysis offers a transferable discourse-based
approach to studying human rights implementation. As noted, the UPR allows for non-
governmental – or, civil society organizations to submit formal written submissions to
the Human Rights Council. These constitute a rich and unique dataset. Founded in the
critical, ‘situated knowledge’ (Stoetzler & Yuval-Davis, 2002) of civil society it reveals
the multiple and inter-connected issues facing human rights compliance in a manner
that complements legal analyses and quantitative rights indicators.
The discourse analysis was operationalized by examining 27 reports submitted by civil
society organizations for the third cycle UPR covering the years 2013–18 (see Appendix 1).
The aforementioned number of CSO submissions under-reports the breadth of civil
society input into the UPR for many are joint submissions authored by broad coalitions
of standalone organizations (one, for example, has input from 20 CSOs, and another is
co-authored by a network which is made up of over 1000+ groups and 4000+ individuals
from 150 countries).17
The discourse analysis was undertaken using a grounded theory approach (Urquhart,
2012) that combined inductive and deductive coding techniques (Fereday & Muir-
Cochrane, 2006). First, in order to generate initial codes of human rights pathologies
related to religious freedom, a formative exploratory reading was undertaken of the sub-
missions. Subsequently, the texts were re-read and all references to violations and
implementation issues around religious freedom and human rights (‘pathologies’) were
copied into a database. This was then carefully and systematically coded. Not only did
this reveal the nature and breadth of the (non-discrete) rights pathologies in the CSO dis-
course, it also showed the ‘issue-salience’ or level of CSO attention to (and prioritization
of) the different issues raised by CSOs in the third cycle UPR corpus. During the coding
process appropriate software18 was used to divide the UPR reports into ‘quasi-sentences’
(or, ‘an argument which is the verbal expression of one term, idea or issue’, Volkens, 2001,
p. 93). Sub-dividing sentences in this manner controlled for long sentences that contained
multiple references to religious freedom issues. To ensure accuracy the coding was
repeated by a research assistant. In the small minority of cases where coding differed19
such instances were re-checked and a final coding agreed. All textual extracts were
logged into a database that enabled descriptive statistical analysis of issue-salience and
subsequent examination of framing.
Framing derives from the classic work of Erving Goffman (1974). It refers to the
language used by policy actors. Effectively it is a ‘schemata of interpretation’ (Goffman,
1974, p. 27) that is concerned with the inherent meanings, sentiments, messages and cri-
ticality in relation to social and political communication (Heine & Narrog, 2015). As the
following reveals, framing deepens the analysis for it moves beyond the level of attention
to different types of rights violation – or pathology – to consider the way that language is
expressed (Druckman, 2001). The frames were inductively generated through systematic
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reading of the corpus of religious freedom extracts in the database. For example, ‘attack’,
‘threat’, ‘hurt/ pain’, ‘injustice’ and ‘fear’. The level of attention to the different frames in
the corpus was determined by content analysis of electronic versions of the CSOs’ UPR
submissions (Krippendorff & Bock, 2008).
Contemporary Pathologies in Upholding Human Rights and Religious
Freedom
In this section the study findings are presented in relation to the pathologies highlighted in
the civil society organizations’ UPR discourse. These are summarized in Table 1. Each is
discussed under one of eight sub-headings below.
Religious-based Violence
Reflecting a wider global trend (Chaney, 2019; Juergensmeyer, 2003; Lewis, 2011), reli-
gious-based violence is the lead pathology in the CSOs’ third cycle UPR discourse, consti-
tuting almost a third (31.2%) of all quasi-sentences. Notwithstanding the UN’s Second
Cycle ‘concern at the losses of life, injuries and damages to religious sites and property
in the most recent confrontations’, and official recommendation that the government
‘ensure the effective investigation and sanctioning of all cases of violence against religious
minorities’ (UNHRC, 2013, para 73 and recommendation 129.93), as the following analy-
sis reveals it remains the principal rights violation. Its cause lies in the politicization of reli-
gion and the resultant opposition of ‘secularism’ and ‘radical extremism’ fuelling longer-
standing inter-communal tensions and religious intolerance. The CSO discourse outlines
how violence against religious minorities, especially, Hindu priests, Christians, Buddhists
and Ahmadiyas has increased significantly over the last few years. Moreover, it shows how
the state has failed to listen to civil society and protect the human rights defenders. In con-
sequence, several working to protect of freedom of religion have been killed (Human
Rights Forum Bangladesh, 2017, p. 4). The CSO discourse also explains how some
groups are more susceptible to violence than others. For example, reports note that chil-
dren have often been victims; ‘they have been subjected to various forms of violence,
including killings, torture and rapes not only at homes but also at schools, communities
and work environments. Furthermore, it is observed that children from ethnic and
religious minority communities are more vulnerable to violence and torture than
others’ (Child Rights Advocacy Coalition in Bangladesh, 2017, p. 5). Despite the
Table 1. Issue salience of human rights pathologies in CSOs’ third cycle UPR
discourse on religious freedom: percentage of all quasi-sentences (N = 923).
Human rights pathology %
Violence 31.2
Restrictions on civil society 17.1
Human rights incompatibility of current laws 13.2
Authorities’ failure to uphold religious freedom (inc. police malpractice) 12.9
Threats/ incitement 11.8
Government failure to respond to earlier UPR recommendations 8.7
Discrimination, (in)equality and oppression 4.7
Conversion issues 0.4
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prevalence of such violence, the Government of Bangladesh has taken little effective action
against extremists.
Blogging has found itself at the heart of the rise in religious violence. Several bloggers
who had written critical posts on Islamic religious extremism have been killed. For
example, Rajib Haidar, a 30-year-old architect who wrote seeking a ban on Jamaat’s fun-
damentalist politics, was stabbed to death in February 2012. Others have suffered a similar
fate. Considering this, a significant strand of the CSO discourse underlines the ‘democratic
pathology’ of the violence. For example, one submission observed that ‘self-censorship in
the media is growing as a result of the endemic violence against journalists and media
outlets, and the systematic impunity enjoyed by those responsible’ (Reporters Without
Borders, 2017, p. 3). Whilst another opined, ‘the killings of bloggers and publishers
who wrote on issues of religion, secularism, atheism, justice for war crimes, and sexuality,
by Islamic fundamentalist groups, have significantly contributed to a climate of fear and
self-censorship among secular writers and in the broader artistic community – this fear
contributes to the shrinking space for civil society’ (Freemuse, Drik, PEN International
and PEN Bangladesh, 2017, p. 5, emphasis added).
Restrictions on Civil Society
Notwithstanding the Second Cycle UPR Recommendation that the Government of Ban-
gladesh ‘take steps to ensure that civil society can operate without intimidation’ (UNHRC,
2013, recommendation 129.103). ‘Restrictions on civil society’ was the second-most pro-
minent pathology in the discourse (17.1% of quasi-sentences). It can be seen as part of a
wider international trend as governments have used legal and coercive means to under-
mine the independence of civil society (e.g., Chaney, 2018a, 2018b; Jefferson & Jensen,
2009; Thornton, 2013). One of the key instruments in the current government clamp
down on civil society is Section 57 of the Information and Communication Technology
Act (2006), which has been frequently used to detain and silence dissidents on flimsy
grounds. It states:
If any person deliberately publishes or transmits or causes to be published or transmitted in
the website or in electronic form any material which is fake and obscene or its effect is such as
to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circum-
stances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it, or causes to deteriorate or
creates possibility to deteriorate law and order, prejudice the image of the State or person or
causes to hurt or may hurt religious belief or instigate against any person or organization,
then this activity of his will be regarded as an offence.20
Moreover, repressive amendments to the Act in 2013 make alleged breaches of Section 57
‘non-bailable and non-referable’ offences, raise the sentence for offences from 10 to 14
years, and grant law enforcement officials the power to arrest without a warrant. Unsur-
prisingly, much of the CSO discourse is coruscating in its criticism of Section 57. Many
highlight the vague nature of the notion of ‘hurt to religious sentiment’. For example,
one CSO noted that, ‘Laws that make it an offence to hurt religious sentiment have a
stifling impact on the enjoyment of freedom of expression and religion and limit a
healthy dialogue and debate on religion’. This account proceeds to underline how the
domestic legal code breaches the country’s international treaty obligations: ‘Prohibitions
of displays of lack of respect for a religion […] are incompatible with ICCPR, except in
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the specific circumstances envisaged in article 20, paragraph 2, of the Covenant’, according
to the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 34.52 Section 57 of the ICT Act
does not meet the criteria for limitation, as stated in article 20 paragraph 2 of ICCPR’
(Freemuse, Drik, PEN International and PEN Bangladesh, 2017, p. 14). This shows
that, from a civil society perspective, the purpose of such laws is seen as being to
silence critics and undermine religious freedom. In another example, a CSO complained
that, ‘members of [… a named] human rights organization were charged under Section 57
of the Information and Communication Technology Act for publishing a report on alleged
extrajudicial executions by security forces during a protest rally in May 2013’ (Amnesty
International, 2017, p. 2).
The Human Rights Incompatibility of Current Laws
Allied to the foregoing, the widespread incompatibility of the Penal Code with human
rights on religious freedom is the third most-cited pathology in the discourse (13.2% of
quasi-sentences). The discourse is typified by the observations of one CSO: ‘A variety of
provisions in the Penal Code seek to protect the feelings of religious believers, including
by prohibiting insults against a religion or religious beliefs as such:
. Section 295 criminalizes defiling “any object held sacred by any class of persons with the
intention of thereby insulting the religion of any class of persons or with the knowledge
that any class of persons is likely to consider such […] defilement as an insult to their
religion […]”, providing for up to 2 years’ imprisonment and/or a fine;
. Section 295A criminalizes “outraging the religious feelings of any class of the citizens of
Bangladesh” “with deliberate and malicious intention” and by insulting the religion or
the religious beliefs of that class, providing for up to 2 years’ imprisonment and/or a
fine;
. Section 298 criminalizes “uttering words […] with deliberate intent to wound religious
feelings”, providing for up to 1 year of imprisonment and/or a fine’ (ARTICLE 19 and
Research Initiatives Bangladesh, 2017, p. 8).
As the CSO discourse underlines, these provisions in the Penal Code are incompatible
with Article 19(3) of the ICCPR, which does not permit limitations on freedom of
expression to protect religions or belief from criticism, or to shield followers of a religion
or belief from offence or insult.21 The civil society criticism of the current legal framework
is echoed by the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief (OHCHR, 2016,
p. 17, para 87), who noted that:
It is a truism that freedom of expression is not absolute and must sometimes be limited.
However, the decisive point is that any limitations deemed necessary must be clearly and nar-
rowly defined and should meet all the criteria contained in constitutional law and inter-
national human rights law. Already section 295A of the old Penal Code fails to meet these
criteria… The offences mentioned in these two sections are only vaguely circumscribed
and thus remain vulnerable to highly subjective invocations and arbitrary applications.
The CSO discourse was also critical of the constitution of Bangladesh. For example, one
complained that it
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recognises the right to freedom of speech and expression, which includes freedom of artistic
expression. However, the Constitution itself… conditions the exercise of this right to the
adherence to moral, political and religious codes, [It is] not consistent with international
law ratified by Bangladesh – including ICCPR and ICESCR. (Freemuse, Drik, PEN Inter-
national and PEN Bangladesh, 2017, p. 8)
A number of CSOs highlighted the incompatibility of the 15th Amendment to the Con-
stitution of 2011 that fell short of restoring secularism as a fundamental principle of
State policy, but retained Islam as a state religion. Echoing Hobbesian European Enlight-
enment thought (that argued when authority asserts power over matters of faith and doc-
trine it invites discord – see Hobbes, 1651), they argue that the Amendment undermines
attempts to protect freedom of religion or belief found elsewhere in the constitution (e.g.,
Article 2A, with guarantees against religious discrimination and Article 28(1) on belief)
and is incompatible with Article 18 of the ICCPR.
A further strand of the CSO discourse centres on personal laws and discrimination
against women and girls. For example, a CSO noted that, ‘in Bangladesh, discriminatory
personal laws affecting all religious communities and women have fewer marriage,
divorce, and inheritance rights than men, which increase their socioeconomic insecurity.
No steps have been taken for the withdrawal of reservations to Article-2 and 16(1) (C) of
UNCEDAW convention’ (Steps Towards Development, 2017, p. 4). The prominence of
this pathology again evidences government failure to respond to civil society criticality
for the UN’s Second Cycle UPR to the Government of Bangladesh concluded that it
needed to urgently: ‘enhance its law reform through partnership and collaboration with
religious leaders, lawyers and civil society organizations including women’s nongovern-
mental organizations’ (OHCHR, 2016, para 98).
Authorities’ Failure to Uphold Religious Freedom
This was the fourth-ranked pathology (12.9% of quasi-sentences). The CSOs express dis-
satisfaction with the actions of authorities from government downwards, notably the
police and the judiciary. Typifying the widespread frustration with the ruling elites, one
CSO noted that the government has formulated no effective strategy to investigate and
prosecute perpetrators of violence against religious and ethnic minorities. As a result, vio-
lence against such communities have increased significantly since the second UPR cycle.
The wider literature suggests (e.g., Haque &Mohammad, 2013; Paksha, 2010) that corrup-
tion is a major factor in the malaise. As one account notes, ‘Bangladesh’s current endemic
corruption situation is deeply rooted in its recent history and the political process it has
gone through… the political parties have given way to the military governments and mili-
tary-backed civil government, who ignored people’s participation and transparency’
(Rahman, 2018, p. 315). It is a view supported by the UPR discourse. For example, one
submission complained that,
The Bangladeshi authorities’ public response to the wave of violent attacks against secular
activists has been marked by a troubling unwillingness to condemn the killings and
appears to shift the focus onto the victims. The police are often reluctant to file charges or
investigate influential politicians or businessmen for threats or violence against media
workers, thereby creating a culture of impunity. (Amnesty International, 2017, p. 4)
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As Inglehart’s (2009) international analysis reveals, there is a co-relationship between state
capacity and rights violation. Citizens feel unsafe and human rights violations occur fre-
quently in states that are weak and lack proper institutionalization. In contrast, stronger
state apparatuses provide safety and security to their citizens as well as protect them
from being subjected to violence or discrimination. The present analysis supports this.
The UPR discourse reflects widespread civil society concern over limited state capacity
(inter alia, measured by political will, human capital, financial resources, staffing levels
and legal powers) – to address religious freedom and communal violence issues. For
example, one CSO complained,
The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) is far from independent and effective due
to gaps in its founding act; absence of provisions regarding investigations of allegations of
rights violations committed by the military and law enforcement agencies LEAs; and lack
of authority to prosecute perpetrators. The Commission’s institutional capacity remains
limited. The process for selection of Commissioners does not fully comply with the Paris
Principles. (Human Rights Forum Bangladesh, 2017, p. 4)
To prosecute perpetrators and to protect citizens’ rights the government needs to
strengthen its law and order mechanisms, especially the police. As Boateng and
Buckner (2017, p. 1) argue, in order to maintain state legitimacy, the role of the
police force needs to be rethought; they should be active and effective not just in elim-
inating violence and discrimination, but also in promoting peace and democratic values
of society. However, the third cycle discourse underlines that, in the case of Bangladesh,
there is significant work to be done before this happens. For example, one CSO
asserted that it was, ‘deeply concerned that between February and October 2015,
seven secular bloggers were killed in a series of attacks against media workers. On
26 February 2015, atheist blogger Avijit Roy was hacked to death and his wife was cri-
tically injured in an attack in Dhaka. While eight people were subsequently detained 29
in connection with Roy’s murder, no charges have been filed against suspects’ (Civicus,
2017, p. 3)
Threats/incitement
This is the fifth most alluded to pathology (11.8% of quasi-sentences). Here it should
be noted that Bangladesh has been involuntary host to several covert extremist reli-
gious groups who have been responsible for inciting violence within the country.
The Third Cycle UPR discourse attests to how this ‘hosting’ role has had dire con-
sequences. For example, one CSO account recalls, ‘how it met members of the Bud-
dhist, Christian and Hindu communities who expressed a deep sense of fear and
insecurity at the rising number of targeted killings and the growth of Islamic mili-
tancy. Many raised concerns about the lack of effective action by the government
and the police to provide protection against and prevent human rights violations
… [and] violent attacks against religious minorities’ (Christian Solidarity Worldwide,
2017, p. 3).
A raft of other examples allude to the prominent case in 2017 regarding human rights
activist Sultana Kamal. The radical Islamic group, Hefazat-e-lslam, deliberately misinter-
preted her comments in a television show and threatened her with violence. Hefazat Vice
President, Junayed A –Habib, even proclaimed that ‘we will break every bone in her body!’
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(Front Line Defenders, 2017, p. 4). Furthermore, as the following example of CSO dis-
course explains, social media are at the centre of current extremist threats and religious
intolerance:
Bloggers and online activists… attracted the attention of extreme religious groups mainly
after their lead on the Shahbagh Movement held in 2013. Then with a view to politicize
the Shahbagh movement, the issue of the religious beliefs of bloggers and online activists
were brought to the forefront of public scrutiny. A smear campaign spread throughout the
nation alleging that the bloggers are atheists and an attempt to frame the movement as a
struggle between the faithful and the nonbelievers. As a result of this, bloggers and online
activists became the target of religious extremists and further created a misconception
among the common people in Bangladesh… These killings are part of an alarming trend
of violent intolerance towards freedom of religion. (Center for Social Activism and Associ-
ation for Progressive Communications, 2017, p. 11)
Government Failure to Respond to Earlier UPR Recommendations
This was the sixth-ranked pathology (8.7% of quasi-sentences). It aligns with the wider
international literature on the non-enforceability of international treaty obligations if
they are not enshrined in domestic law (Bowman, 2007). The civil society discourse is con-
demnatory of the state’s failure to act. For example, referring to the country’s second UPR
in 2013, one CSO noted that: ‘Bangladesh accepted 185 recommendations from the UN
Committee – with ten of them concerning freedom of religion. The government has
since then taken some action against perpetrators of violence against minorities and
tried to ensure that freedom of religion and belief is maintained. Although in some
cases the perpetrators of violence have been brought to justice, in general, the state has
not been able to contain or stop such extremist violence; frequency of threat and
attacks continue to occur, threatening the security and wellbeing of ethnic and religious
minorities in different parts of the country’ (Christian Solidarity Worldwide, 2017, p. 3).
Furthermore, during the 2013 UPR, the Bangladeshi government also agreed to ensure
the freedom and autonomy of civil society. However, the CSO discourse asserts that evi-
dence suggests the contrary. It cites restrictions on freedom of expression, a shrinking of
the civic space and increasing state oppression. Thus for example, one CSO noted that,
‘overall, we find that despite Bangladesh accepting many UPR recommendations…
minimal progress has been made on their implementation. Of particular concern are
the continued existence of laws, together with legislative proposals, that impose impermis-
sibly broad limits on free expression online and offline; increasing attacks against journal-
ists, bloggers and human rights defenders and on-going impunity; and the continued
targeting of religion and belief minorities’ (ARTICLE 19 and Research Initiatives Bangla-
desh, 2018, p. 2).
Discrimination, (In)Equality and Oppression
This was the seventh-ranked pathology (4.7% quasi sentences). Amongst a range of issues,
the CSOs highlighted sex discrimination affecting women from across difference religious
communities. For example, one pointed out the discriminatory nature of personal laws
that negatively affect women from all religious communities, especially on matters
related to marriage, divorce and inheritance rights. As a consequence, ‘women experience
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more socio-economic insecurity than men’22 (Steps Towards Development, 2017, p. 2). In
addition to gender discrimination, several CSOs also highlighted discrimination against
religious minorities. For example, ‘the Jummas, an indigenous community in the Chitta-
gong Hill Tracts (CHT) region, have constantly been harassed and prevented from practi-
cing their religion. Even sometimes, the security forces destroyed their worship places and
disrupted the observance of religious rituals’ (Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organ-
ization, 2017, p. 3).
Furthermore, intersectional equality issues were a prominent trope. For example, one
CSO highlighted that, ‘Visible LGBT activists are under physical threat from religious
extremists. Government officials and police do not have transparent processes for
holding individuals and groups accountable. The murder of Xulhaz and Tonoy and the
lack of a strong government response demonstrates the lack of legal protection for
LGBT people’ (Roopbaan, 2017, p. 9).
Conversion Issues
Earlier work has highlighted how religious minorities, the poor and vulnerable have been
particularly susceptible to forced conversion to Islam. As Uddin (2016, p. 326) explains,
‘over the years, many incidents of… forced religious conversion… took place in the
river-valleys, often committed by the security forces and settlers against the Khyoungsa
indigenous people’. The issue of forced conversion is particularly prevalent in the north
of the country, ‘as part of a nationalist purification process, the Bangladesh government
subsequently encouraged the migration of plains dwelling Bengali Muslims to the CHT.
Tribals were increasingly vulnerable to… forced conversion to Islam by the new settlers’
(Jhala, 2013, p. 118). More recently, the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or
belief found that,
Feelings of insecurity exist in communities from which people have converted. Smaller min-
ority communities in particular have expressed concerns that they would in the long term
lose their members to the predominant Islam or to Christian missionaries, which fosters sus-
picion of other communities. Furthermore, rumours and unrealistic projections can damage
the general harmonious relations between the followers of different religious groups.
(UNHRC, 2016, para 59)
The Rapporteur’s account also points to an economic dimension to forced conversions;
‘Trying to convert others likewise falls within freedom of religion or belief, as long as
that persuasion is free from any coercion. This is an important caveat. However, its appli-
cation in practice is not always easy, and there are lots of grey zones in this field. Mission-
ary activities should certainly not exploit the vulnerability of people, for instance, those
living in extreme poverty’ (OHCHR, 2016, para 61). The Bangladesh Government is cur-
rently pursuing a policy of discouraging missionary activities, with a view to avoiding reli-
gious conflicts and forced conversion. There have been restrictions on the issuing of visas
for international co-religionists. According to the UN, ‘Religious minority communities
deplored the fact that inviting fellow believers from abroad can become quite difficult,
which also may infringe upon their freedom of religion or belief. Members of Christian
communities reported they felt exposed to the unfounded suspicion that they would
engage in systematic proselytism’ (OHCHR, 2016, para 62).
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Although the issue of forced conversion attracted limited attention in the CSO dis-
course (0.4% of quasi-sentences) the scale and nature of the alleged conversion incidences
is troubling. One CSO reported that, ‘A convert to Christianity from Islam, Hossain Ali,
was also hacked to death on 22ndMarch 2017 by three Islamist assailants in his hometown
of Garialpara, Kurigram in northern Bangladesh, who approached him on motorbikes,
threw a Molotov cocktail at him, and attacked him with sharp weapons, killing him on
the spot’ (ADF International, 2017, p. 6). According to the CSO discourse, children
have often been taken out of their homes and forcibly converted to Islam. Although
some of these children do return to their homes, many of them go missing. For
example, one CSO noted that over the past seven years 72 children have been taken
from their families under the guise of a better life, and then forcibly converted to Islam
against their will and the will of their parents (Cultural Survival and AILC, 2017, p. 5).
Such instances not only violate individual rights to freedom of religion and belief but
also contravene Bangladesh’s obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child.
Finally, it is worth reflecting on how the foregoing pathologies might be thought of in
relation to each other. The relationship between them emerges from the ‘governance view’
that this study employs. In other words, our analytical framework is linked to the tensions
that emerge when seeking to apply universal values set out in UN treaties in specific gov-
ernance contexts with their own cultures, histories and governing traditions. It reflects the
reality that local human rights practices are contingent and place-based. The different
rights pathologies in this study can be seen to fall into two broad groupings. The first
relates to governmentality – not least, periods of authoritarian rule, patronage and the
exercise of executive power. The pathologies in this group include: restrictions on civil
society, corruption in public administration (in turn, contributing to authorities’ failure
to uphold religious freedom including police malpractice) and government failure to
respond to earlier UPR recommendations. The second is concerned with inequalities
and discrimination in the pluri-religious state. Specific pathologies in this group include
violence, threats and incitement.
The Framing of the CSO UPR Discourse on Religious Freedom
Essentially, the following analysis reveals that the framing of the civil society discourse (in
terms of ‘attack’, rights-denial, threat, hurt/ pain, defence, (in)justice, and fear) – reflects
the emotions and experiences stemming from the basic opposition of the two remaining
frames – ‘secularism’ and ‘radical extremism’ – as well as longer-standing inter-communal
tensions and religious intolerance exacerbated by the rise of extremism.
Civil society organizations’ identification of violence as the principal human rights
pathology in the UPR corpus is reflected in the framing of the discourse on religious
freedom. The most prominent frame used by civil society organizations is the notion of
‘attack’ on minorities and religious freedom (Table 2). Together with associated tropes
(see below), it accounts for almost a half (45.7% of all quasi-sentences, N = 756). Secu-
larists are frequently the target and extremism is often cited as the cause of the attacks.
For example, one CSO report described how ‘seven secular bloggers were killed in a
series of attacks against media workers between February and October 2015’
(Civicus, 2017, p. 3).
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The denial of human rights was the second most cited frame (17.5% of quasi-sen-
tences). A core strand of the discourse using this frame alluded to widespread restriction
and oppression of human rights defenders. For example, ‘human rights defenders, secular
activists, and others have suffered restrictions on their right to freedom of expression.
They have faced repressive tactics, received threats or been subjected to physical attacks
(some of which have proved fatal) by armed groups and other non-state actors’
(Amnesty International, 2018, p. 4).
Reflecting the negative psychological consequences of the current situation in Bangla-
desh ‘threat’ was the third-ranked frame (12.2% of quasi-sentences). Frequently, it was
associated with the actions of extremist groups. For example, ‘in May 2015, four
masked men killed a citizen-journalist in broad daylight who wrote for Mukto-Mona
(‘Free Thinking’). He had been getting threats from Islamist extremists for months in con-
nection with his blog posts’ (Reporters Without Borders, 2018, p. 2).
‘Hurt/ pain’ was the fifth-ranked frame. Its principal use was in reference to the
notion of ‘hurting religious sentiments’ in relation to ‘Section 57’ restrictions. For
example, ‘the Information Communications Technology (ICT) Act, which was passed
in 2006 and amended in 2013, poses a serious threat to freedom of expression of
LGBT communities. It criminalizes ‘hurting religious sentiments’ and dissenters as
well as members of minority communities have been imprisoned under this law’
(Roopbaan, 2018, p. 2). The defence of individual and group rights was the sixth-
ranked frame. For example one account described how law enforcement officials har-
assed Christians noting that ‘on 24 March 2017, four plain-clothes police officers
near Dhaka raided the home of a Christian woman without a warrant. When the
neighbours tried to defend her, around 30 policemen attacked and beat the villagers’
(Christian Solidarity Worldwide, 2018, p. 6).
(In)justice was the eighth-ranked frame. CSOs emphasized the barriers to justice for
victims and their families – including ‘cases of enforced disappearances, extrajudicial kill-
ings, and torture’ (Solidarity Group for Bangladesh, 2018, p. 5). Finally, ‘fear’ was the
ninth-ranked frame. CSOs noted how state oppression, Islamic extremism, religious/
ethnic discrimination, attack on bloggers and several other instances of everyday violence
have created a climate of fear in society. As a consequence, several secular writers and
blogger have left the country – whilst, the discourse highlights, those who remain have
decided to resort to self-censorship.
Table 2. The principal frames in the in CSOs’ third cycle UPR discourse on
religious freedom: percentage of all quasi-sentences (N = 756).
Frame %
‘attack’ 45.7
Rights (denial) 17.5
threat 12.2
secularism 7.5
hurt/pain 4.7
defend 4.3
radical extremism 3.1
(in)Justice 3.0
Fear 2.1
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Discussion
The foregoing analysis paints a troubling picture of religious intolerance and violence in
today’s Bangladesh. Drawing on ‘situated knowledge’ in the form of civil society organiz-
ations’ accounts of the current situation – as submitted to the latest UPR, the findings
reveal the pathologies, emotions and experiences stemming from the basic opposition
of ‘secularism’ and ‘radical extremism’ – and, how in turn it is fuelling long-standing
inter-communal tensions and religious intolerance. One of the major factors responsible
for this malaise is the politicization of religion. Specifically, the sustained mainstreaming of
Islam in public political life that began in the mid-1970s, such that by the mid-1990s,
Islamic symbols and idioms had become part of everyday politics. Another is the critical
juncture that came in 2011 with the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which
overturned earlier secular aspirations and confirmed Islam as the State religion of the
Republic.
The present analysis also reveals powerful accounts of the principal human rights path-
ology affecting the country today, religious-based violence. It is a narrative associated with
police malpractice/ judicial failings, discrimination, oppression and incitement. The analy-
sis is founded in the situated knowledge of legal restrictions and government repression of
civil society organizations. In public policy terms, as the literature on agenda-setting
(Cobb & Ross, 1997) highlights, ranking the violations identifies which issues CSOs
think are most in need of OHCHR condemnation and government action. In another
regard, the analysis tells us that we need to understand threats to religious freedom in Ban-
gladesh as being more than a simple narrative of the rise of emergent ‘political Islam’.
Rather, as the diverse issues and framings in the civil society discourse suggest, the
threat to religious freedom is multi-faceted, contingent and place-based. It is grounded
in Bangladesh’s culture, history and governing traditions. By taking a ‘governance view’
of rights implementation we see that the non-discrete pathologies fall into two broad
groupings. One concerned with governmentality (inter alia, periods of authoritarian
rule, party politics and political patronage) that includes restrictions on civil society,
corruption in public administration (in turn, contributing to authorities’ failure to
uphold religious freedom including police malpractice) and government failure to
respond to earlier UPR recommendations. The second is associated with inequalities
and discrimination in the pluri-religious state. These include violence, threats and
incitement.
Analysis of the framing of civil society discourse tells us about the underlying emotions
and meanings attached CSOs’ accounts. These apply to the breadth of rights pathologies
identified in the first section of this article. In ranking the frames according to their pro-
minence in the UPR corpus we follow established scientific method in discourse analysis
(Goffman, 1974; Singh & Swanson, 2017; Snow, 2013). As Snow (2013, p. 136) explains,
‘frame analysis is rooted in the symbolic interactionist and constructionist principle
that meanings do not naturally or automatically attach themselves to the objects,
events, or experiences we encounter, but arise, instead, through interpretive processes’.
He continues, ‘like picture frames, they focus attention by punctuating or bracketing
what in our sensual field is relevant and what is irrelevant, what is “in-frame” and what
is “out-of-frame,”’. Thus, by considering the emphasis or relative level of attention we
place on different frames ‘they function as articulation mechanisms in the sense of
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tying together the various punctuated elements of the scene so that one set of meanings
rather than another is conveyed, or, in the language of narrativity, one story rather
than another is told’. In addition, frame analysis humanizes the research data rather
than merely categorizing the pathologies identified in the first part of our analysis. In
this way they illuminate the personal and group experience of oppression and denial of
religious freedom.
At this juncture it is apposite to reflect upon how CSOs continue their work in the face
of the ongoing threat to religious freedom – and the ways they compromise, resist, or col-
laborate with each other and with government. The context to this issue is set out in a
growing literature on government restrictions on civil society (Feldman, 2015; Haque &
Ahsan, 2014; Mohajan, 2014; Sahoo & Chaney, 2020; Saidul Islam, 2011). This repression
has had a wide-ranging impact on the ability of exogenous interests to criticize govern-
ment. This includes the curtailing of CSOs’ ability to collaborate with international
NGOs and funders – as explained in the following UPR submission:
Under the Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Act, CSOs wishing to receive
funds from foreign sources or collaborate with international actors must register annually
with the Non-Governmental Organisation Affairs Bureau (NGOAB) and seek permission
for planned activities prior to receiving funds. After legislative amendments in 2016, the
NGOAB gained wide-ranging discretionary powers [… this has led…] to a situation
where CSOs can be financially enfeebled and unable to operate, pending permission
from the NGOAB… the strengthening of the Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities)
Act has stymyied operation of independent civil society groups in Bangladesh. (Civicus,
2017, p. 4)
Others have alluded to how: ‘The government has used draconian legislation against a
wide spectrum of civil society in an attempt to silence them’ (Amnesty International,
2017, p. 2); and how CSOs are, ‘concerned that the government continues to restrict
freedom of expression and is failing to provide adequate protections to human rights
defenders campaigning for freedom of religious belief’ (Christian Solidarity Worldwide,
2017, p. 4).
The civil society discourse also reveals how government repression is curtailing
cooperation and co-working between CSOs. For example, one referred to how ‘the killings
of human rights defenders and the subsequent government inaction also led to the disin-
tegration of activist networks and loss of community trust’ (Front Line Defenders, 2017,
p. 3). For its part the UN has said the legal restrictions have ‘undoubtedly ha[d] a chilling
effect on civil society organizations, human rights activists and members of religious min-
ority communities. It contributes greatly to the perception of a shrinking space for frank
public discourse’ (OHCHR, 2016, para 86).
CSO resistance is illustrated by the words of another CSO which said, ‘the Bangladeshi
government does not take kindly to criticism of its constitution or the State religion, Islam.
Journalists and bloggers who resist censorship or self-censorship on these subjects may
face life imprisonment, the death penalty, or murder by Islamist militants, who often
issue online calls for the deaths of outspoken secularist bloggers and writers’ (Reporters
Without Borders, 2017, p. 6).
In terms of how CSOs’ are continuing their work in the face of government repression,
the discourse reveals the value of UPR as a mechanism to attract international attention,
criticize and call for government to change its ways. For example, one CSO said: we ‘call on
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the Government of Bangladesh to create and maintain, in law and in practice, an enabling
environment for civil society, in accordance with the rights enshrined in the ICCPR, the
UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders and Human Rights Council resolutions 22/
6, 27/5 and 27/31’ (Civicus, 2017, p. 2).
The overwhelming narrative of the CSO discourse is one of dissent and resistance to
repression and government failure to uphold religious freedom. Accounts of co-
working with government are absent from the corpus of UPR submissions.23 As noted,
consonant with the classical work of liberal theorists (Hobbes, 1651; Rousseau, 1968) as
well as later thinkers on the role of civil society (e.g., De Tocqueville, 1835/1956), we
argue that the present findings on the suppression of civil society and growing intolerance
and religious-based violence means that unprecedented importance now attaches to safe-
guarding civil society criticality in order to uphold religious freedom and address prevail-
ing human rights pathologies in the Republic.
Notes
1. As Islam (2016, p. 25) argues, ‘Islamist extremists represent a politics of revenge and hatred
with no clear objective to uplift the socio-economic conditions and livelihood prospects of
the people’.
2. The use of the term ‘pathology’ follows the classic work of Brian Hogwood and Guy Peters’
seminal work The Pathology of Public Policy (1985) comparing the human body and the body
politic using the language of medical pathology to investigate the disorders and challenges
governments experience in making and implementing policy, including imperatives such
as upholding human rights. In metaphorical terms, it also fits with the present use of
corpus analysis of CSOs’ discourse.
3. Casanova (2011) has distinguished between the secular (modern epistemic category), secu-
larization (modern world-historical process) and secularism (worldview and ideology).
Especially for him, secularization could mean: (a) institutional differentiation between the
sacred and the profane, (b) decline of religious beliefs and practices, and (c) privatization
of religion.
4. There is a good deal of variation within Europe; it is not a homogeneous category. Different
countries in Europe have followed different model of secularism. While countries like Spain,
Poland and Italy have privileged one religion; other countries like France have followed
Laicite.
5. It refers that the state shall not be associated with any particular religion and permit freedom
of conscience, belief and religion for all citizens without any discrimination.
6. See Swatos (2003, p. 79).
7. While Sahoo (2013) discusses the liberal-pluralist, the Neo-Marxist and the Communitarian
understandings of civil society, Jensen (2006) discusses the pluralist conceptions of civil
society through an analysis of the sphere concept, the Lockean concept and the Scottish
concept.
8. For an excellent discussion on the relationship between civil society and the authoritarian
state, see Lewis (2013).
9. https://203.112.218.65:8008/WebTestApplication/userfiles/Image/National%20Reports/
SED_REPORT_Vol-4.pdf [Last accessed 21.06.18]
10. The Preamble to the Constitution says: ‘We, the people of Bangladesh, having proclaimed our
independence on the 26th day of March, 1971 and through 2[ a historic struggle for national
liberation], established the independent, sovereign People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Pledging
that the high ideals of nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism’ https://hrlibrary.
umn.edu/research/bangladesh-constitution.pdf.
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11. The BNP that was created by General Zia-ur-Rahman as a counter to the secular Awami
League positioned itself as party in tune with religious beliefs
12. On 6 December 1992, a crowd of Hindu Kar Sevaks (activists) demolished the sixteenth-
century Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh. The demolition occurred after a violent
political rally at the site.
13. Prime Minister of Bangladesh from 1991 to 1996, and again from 2001 to 2006.
14. Three developments prepared the ground for the Fifteenth Amendment. The murderers of
Sheik Mujib were executed. This dealt a body blow to the counter-revolution and a legal
ruling declared the Fifth Amendment to the constitution ‘unconstitutional’. Finally, the
movement of the Sector Commanders’ Forum’s (2007–08) demands for the trial of war crim-
inals prompted a popular response, particularly from young people, calling for the revival
and re-establishment of Mukti Judhyer Chetona – or, the restoration of the Constitution.
In electoral terms, these factors also saw the victory of the Awami League-led Grand Alliance
and the defeat of the Islam-pasand Four-Party Alliance, led by the BNP in the 2008 parlia-
mentary election.
15. However, Bangladesh has made reservations to article 14 (3) (d) of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights.
16. This is an ongoing state of political turmoil between the two main political parties, the
Awami League (AL) led by prime minister Sheikh Hasina and the opposition Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP) led by Khaleda Zia. In the wake of the controversial 2014 general
election, the BNP raised several demands for a second election under a neutral caretaker gov-
ernment. In January 2015 their demands remained unmet and the BNP initiated countrywide
protests. Violent clashes ensued, the AL called the BNP terrorists and Khaleda Zia was for-
cefully confined to her office.
17. Human Rights Forum, Bangladesh (HRFB). The network is Namati.
18. UAM Corpus Tool 3.
19. 15 instances.
20. https://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Bangladesh/comm2006.pdf.
21. Ergo, because such expression does not, per se, intend to have the likely consequence of advo-
cating hatred against a group. If the intention was such it would constitute incitement to hos-
tility, violence or discrimination proscribed in Article 20(2) of the ICCPR.
22. Bangladesh has reservations to Article-2 and 16(1)(C) of CEDAW
23. However, it should be noted that there are those that do have strong links with government. The
background to this is that government crackdown on civil society organizations’ political acti-
vism led to a split within theNGOumbrella bodyADAB (Association ofDevelopmentAgencies
in Bangladesh). NGOs wary of political activism left forming a new body, the Federation of
NGOs in Bangladesh (FNB). As Rahman’s (2006, p. 464) instructive account highlights, this
can be seen as ‘another attempt by the state to penetrate and fracture a civil society group
along partisan lines’. The result was that FNB organizations now mainly focus on service deliv-
ery and advocacy functions rather than mobilization (Chowdhury et al., 2017). It is in this
context that, ‘largeNGOs like BRACorGrameen Bank enjoy cooperative relations with the gov-
ernment and widespread public support among the Bangladeshi elite’ (Rahman, 2006, p. 464).
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